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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CHINESE AND WESTERN TREATY PRACTICE: AN
APPLICATION TO THE JOINT DECLARATION
BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND
GREAT BRITAIN CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF
HONG KONG
INTRODUCTION
In September of 1984,1 Great Britain and the People's Republic of
China (PRC)2 concluded a Joint Declaration on the question of Hong
Kong. 3 Under the Joint Declaration, Great Britain agreed to relinquish
1. See D. BONAVIA, HONG KONG 1997: THE FINAL SETTLEMENT 7 (1985) [herein-
after cited as D. BONAVIA] (noting that the initialling of the Joint Declaration occurred
on September 26, 1984 and the ratifying occurred on June 30, 1985).
2. The People's Republic of China exercises sovereignty over the Chinese mainland.
The Communist government gained control of China in 1949. Prior to 1949, the Com-
munists' rivals, the Nationalists, controlled China's government. With the Communist
takeover, however, the Nationalists retreated to the island province of Taiwan (includ-
ing the Pescadores, Quegnoy and Matsu), which today is the only area of China con-
trolled by the Republic of China. See Cohen, Recognizing China, 50 FOREIGN AFF. 30
(1971) (chronicling official United States position vis-a-vis Chinese Communists and
Nationalists); J. FAiRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 1 (1981) (introducing
issues of importance for Chinese foreign relations); J. FAIRBANK & K.C. Liu, 11 Cms,-
BRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA, LATE CHING 1800-1911, PART 2, 1 (1980) (outlining
Chinas foreign policy historically); Hu, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN CHINESE
REVOLUTION 1 (1977) (describing Communist Chinese historical perspective).
3. Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the
Question of Hong Kong, September 26, 1984, 40 B jl. REV. 1, 6 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Joint Declaration]. An examination of the history of the founding of Hong
Kong provides necessary insight as to the rationale for the Joint Declaration. See D.
BONAVIA, supra note 1, at 19-32 (detailing Western intervention, Chinese responses,
and growing trade in Hong Kong's history). The first significant event in Hong Kong's
founding occurred at the close of the Opium War in 1842. To end the war, the Ching
Emperor ceded in fee the island of Hong Kong to Great Britain. Treaty of Nanking,
August 29, 1842, China-Great Britain, 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 389,
390, reprinted in 123 Parry's T.S. 465, 467 (1979). In 1860 China ceded in fee both
the Stonecutters Island and the southern part of the Kowloon Peninsula (known as
"Kowloon") to Great Britain. Convention of Peking, October 24, 1860, China-Great
Britain, 50 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 10, 11, reprinted in 123 Parry's T.S.
71, 73 (1979). The newly acquired lands provided a valuable source of trade revenue to
the British. D. BONAVIA, supra note 1, at 25. Britain, however, found these territories
difficult to protect. Id. Consequently, in 1898, after further hostilities, China leased 350
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sovereignty over Hong Kong to the PRC by July 1, 1997. 4 In return,
the PRC consented to limit its control over Hong Kong, its new admin-
istrative region. 5 Specifically, the PRC agreed to leave Hong Kong's
present social and economic system basically intact.6 The Joint Decla-
ration, despite the PRC's assurances that Hong Kong will remain so-
cially and economically unchanged, may significantly redefine Hong
Kong's status as an international center of commerce.7
miles of land north of Kowloon, known as the New Territories, to Great Britain, for a
term of ninety-nine years. This lease terminates on June 30, 1997. Convention of 1898,
June 9, 1898, China-Great Britain, 90 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 17, re-
printed in 186 Parry's T.S. 310 (1979). Thus the generic term "Hong Kong" repre-
sents Hong Kong Island, Stonecutter Island, Kowloon, and the New Territories.
4. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at i. Great Britain's lease of the New Territories
terminates in 1997. Id. Hong Kong, however, depends on the New Territories for much
of its water supply, electric generating source, present and future manufacturing
plants, and housing for approximately one-half of its inhabitants. N. MINERS, 15 THE
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 313 (1981) [hereinafter cited as N. MIN-
ERS]. Therefore, without the land buffer or the resources from the New Territories,
Hong Kong, under an isolated and vulnerable British controller, exposes itself to eco-
nomic pressure or military attack from the PRC. Id.
5. See South China Morning Post, July 17, 1982, at 1, col. 2 (noting that Hong
Kong will be a "special administrative region"). The PRC created the concept of "spe-
cial administrative region" under article 31 of its 1982 Constitution. See P.R.C.
CONsT. art. 31 (1982) (noting concept was originated to reunite Taiwan with the main-
land, allowing Taiwan to retain a capitalist economic system in exchange for accepting
the overall political sovereignty of the People's Republic); see also P.R.C. CONST. pre-
amble (1982) (mentioning only Taiwan in a passage explaining the reunification of the
motherland).
6. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at annex 1, art. 6. The Joint Declaration per-
mits Hong Kong to maintain its capitalist economic and trade system. Id. Specifically,
Hong Kong may maintain its free ports and continue its policy of free trade. Id. at
annex 1, art. 13. In addition, the Joint Declaration allows Hong Kong to:
maintain the rights and freedoms as provided for by the laws previously in force
in Hong Kong, including freedom of the person, of speech, of the press, of assem-
bly, of association, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike, to form
or to join trade unions, of demonstration, of choice, of occupation, of academic
research, of belief.
Id. at annex I, art. 13.
7. Hong Kong maintains an international reputation as a leading manufacturing
and commercial center. See N. MINERS, supra note 4 (describing Hong Kong's reputa-
tion in 1975) ; Chiu, 1984 Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong and its Implications
on China's Unification, 21 ISSUES AND STUDIES 13 (1985) (noting that Hong Kong is
the world's third largest financial center); A. YOUNGSON, HONG KONG: ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND POLICY 92-114 (1978) (discussing Hong Kong's role as an international
trading center); see also N. MINERS, supra note 4, at 53 (discussing how consistent
policies of free enterprise and trade motivate foreign businesses to use the port as a
center for the transshipment of goods to the PRC and the rest of Asia); W. BEAZER,
THE COMMERCIAL FUTURE OF HONG KONG 61 (1978) (noting that in addition to its
status as a trading middleman, Hong Kong's manufacturing capabilities make it one of
the world's twenty leading exporters). Hong Kong also derives a significant amount of
its income from investment capital. N. MINERS, supra note 4, at 53. This investment
capital makes Hong Kong one of Asia's largest financial centers, supplying banking,
insurance, and investment services to international trading companies operating
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The Joint Declaration creates a new concept of "one country, two
systems." s This concept, while novel in its approach, fosters skepticism
among experts as to the PRC's future behavior toward Hong Kong.,
The marriage between the world's freest economic marketplace and the
world's largest socialist economy paints an ironic picture.
The success of this marriage depends on a number of legal and polit-
ical factors. The Joint Declaration's potential for success requires an
analysis of the PRC's past treaty performance along with its current
political climate in relation to traditional Western treaty practice. Sec-
tion I of this Comment describes Western treaty practice, outlining key
provisions within the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties.' 0 Section II evaluates the historical foundations of the PRC's
treaty performance. It traces the evolution of this performance by re-
viewing the PRC's behavior in prior treaty obligations and compares
and contrasts this performance with the principles embodied in the Vi-
enna Convention. Section III discusses the significant political events
leading to the enactment of the Joint Declaration and explains the
scope of the Joint Declaration.' Section IV then examines the
throughout the Pacific basin. Id.
8. See generally Weisskopf, Peking Eyes Taiwan as Accord Is Initialled, Washing-
ton Post, Sept. 27, 1984, at A21, col. 2 (noting that Premier Deng Xiaoping coined this
phrase during negotiations over the Joint Declaration to pacify Britain and Hong Kong,
and to entice the Taiwanese to negotiate to reunite with the Chinese people).
9. See Chiu, 1984 Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong and its Implications on
China's Unification, 21 ISSUES & STUDIES 13 (1985) (discussing the extent of Hong
Kong's autonomy under the Joint Declaration); Clarke, Hong Kong Under the Chinese
Constitution, 14 HONG KONG L.J. 71 (1984) (discussing the constitutionality of an
autonomous Hong Kong under the PRC Constitution).
10. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, A/CONF. 39/11/
Add.2 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]; see infra notes 12-41 and accompany-
ing text (describing provisions of the Vienna Convention).
11. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at art. 3(5). The Joint Declaration and its
three annexes discuss the framework for Hong Kong's governance after 1997. Id. The
Joint Declaration summarizes the subsequent annexes, and provides a general synthesis
of the PRC's basic policies toward Hong Kong. Id.
Annex I elaborates upon these basic policies. The material includes a construction of
Hong Kong's executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, the PRC's
role in this construction, the continuance of Hong Kong as a financial center, the main-
tenance of Hong Kong's educational system, and the citizenship status of individuals
currently living in the British territory. Id. at annex I. Annex II details the establish-
ment of a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group whose formation proposes to ensure a
smooth transfer of Government in 1997. Id. at annex II. Annex III clarifies the confu-
sion as to the possessory right of individuals leasing land prior to 1997, for a term
expiring after 1997. Id. at annex III.
See generally Comment, Legal Aspect of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the
Future of Hong Kong, 20 TEX. IN'L L. REV. 167 (1985) (providing an analysis of the
Joint Declaration's provisions); Comment, International Agreements: Joint Declaration
of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong,
26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249 (1985) (elaborating on provisions of the Joint Declaration).
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probability for a successful implementation of the Joint Declaration
based on both the PRC's past performance in its treaty obligations and
its current political climate.
I. Western Treaty Practice as Codified Under the Vienna
Convention
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties entered into force on
January 27, 1980.12 It culminated a thirty year effort to incorporate
customary principles of treaty interpretation into a general convention
on international treaty law.1" The Vienna Convention addresses topics
traditionally considered within the framework of the law of treaties.
These topics include: conclusion and entry into force of treaties,1 4 ob-
servance, application, and interpretation of treaties, 15 amendment and
modification of treaties,16 and invalidity, termination, and suspension of
operation of treaties.17 The Vienna Convention also articulates proce-
dural rules concerning treaty depositories, notifications, corrections,
and registration.1 8
12. See J. SINCLAIR, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES I (2d cd.
1984) (providing an analysis of the Vienna Convention). Article 84 of the Vienna Con-
vention provides that the Vienna Convention enters into force on the thirtieth day fol-
lowing the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession.
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 84. The Convention entered into force on
January 27, 1980, following the deposit by Togo on December 28, 1979 of the thirty-
fifth instrument of ratification or accession. J. SINCLAIR, supra, at 1. Great Britain
acceded to the Vienna Convention on June 25, 1971. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOS-
ITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1984, 695 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
13. See J. SINCLAIR, supra note 12, at 3. The effort to codify treaty law into a
convention began with the work program of the International Law Commission in
1949. Id.
14. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at part II. This part of the Convention is
divided into three sections, the first relating to the conclusion of treaties (articles 6-18),
the second to reservations (articles 19-23), and the third to entry into force and provi-
sional application (articles 24 and 25). Id.
15. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at part III. Part III is divided into four
sections regarding observance of treaties, application of treaties, interpretation of trea-
ties, and treaties with third states. Id.
16. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at part IV. Part IV consists of three articles
(articles 39-41) concerning amendment and modification of treaties. Id.
17. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at part V. Part V, consisting of articles 42-
72, articulates the circumstances in which a treaty ceases to apply, in whole or in part,
because of an acknowledged ground of invalidity, termination, or suspension. Id.
18. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at part VII. See generally S. MALAWER,
IMPOSED TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977) (asserting that similar to other
multilateral treaties, the eight parts of the Vienna Convention attempt to envelop many
conflicting interests and viewpoints, sacrificing the clarity of specific definitions for the
neutrality of simplistic abstractions).
The Vienna Convention's applicability is limited to treaties concluded between states.
J. SINCLAIR, supra note 12, at 231. Therefore, treaties concluded between states and
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This Comment only discusses parts three and five of the Vienna Con-
vention as only these parts apply to bilateral treaties. Part three dis-
cusses treaty observance, application, and interpretation, and part five
deals with treaty invalidity, termination, and suspension of operations.19
A. VIENNA CONVENTION PART V: ADHERENCE TO BILATERAL
TREATIES
1. Termination of Bilateral Treaties
Part five of the Vienna Convention sets forth conditions that justify
invalidating bilateral treaties. 20 Two of the most ambiguous and contro-
versial conditions that allow a state to invalidate a treaty include coer-
cion and fundamental change of circumstance.21 The sections that fol-
low discuss both conditions.
a. Terminating a Treaty under the Coercive Force Theory
The Vienna Convention invalidates treaties that are procured by the
use or threat of use of force when the threat or use violates the interna-
tional legal norms embodied in the United Nations Charter.22 Although
the United Nations Charter never specifically defines force, the Vienna
Convention's framers agreed that force encompasses armed or physical
aggression.23 Subsequent to the Vienna Convention's passage, the fram-
ers passed a declaration condemning states' use of economic or political
international organizations, or concluded by international organizations with other in-
ternational organizations, fall outside the scope of the Vienna Convention. Vienna Con-
vention, supra note 10, at art. 1.
19. None of the other six parts of the Vienna Convention significantly affect a con-
cluded and ratified bilateral treaty. Part I introduces the Vienna Convention. Vienna
Convention, supra note 10, at part I. Part II defines the procedure for concluding a
treaty. Id. at part II. Part IV discusses the modification of a multilateral treaty. Id. at
part IV. Part VI elaborates upon the problems of state succession. Id. at part VI. Part
VII outlines the format for treaty ratification. Id. at part VII. Part VIII designates the
specific procedure that enters the Vienna Convention into force. Id. at part VIII.
20. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at part V; see S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF
TREATiES: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 250-
371 (1970) (discussing the specific provisions contained in part V); J. SINCLAIR, Supra
note 12, at 159-202.
21. Coercion and fundamental change in circumstance are controversial because no
accepted definitions of either state coercion or fundamental change in circumstance
exist. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (discussing the international inter-
pretation of state coercion); infra notes 26-27 (discussing the international interpreta-
tion of fundamental change in circumstance).
22. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 52; see U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4)
(prohibiting threat or use of force in international relations).
23. See J. SINCLAIR, supra note 12, at 178 (citing framer's comments and discuss-
ing the term "force" and the general controversy surrounding its interpretation).
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pressure to procure treaties."' The declaration, however, does not spe-
cifically compel inclusion of economic or political pressure in the Vi-
enna Convention's definition of coercive force.25 The ultimate decision
to include economic or political pressure in the definition of coercion
rests with interpreters of the Vienna Convention.
b. Terminating a Treaty Under the Fundamental Change in Circum-
stance Theory
The Vienna Convention also permits treaty abrogation if a funda-
mental change in circumstance occurs, and the change was unforesee-
able at the time that the parties signed the treaty.28 A fundamental
change in circumstance is loosely defined as a changed circumstance
that must constitute an essential basis of the consideration that origi-
nally bound the parties to a treaty and it must radically transform par-
ties' remaining treaty obligations."'
B. VIENNA CONVENTION PART III: OBSERVATION AND
INTERPRETATION OF BILATERAL TREATIES
1. Observing Bilateral Treaties
Part three of the Vienna Convention encompasses treaty observation
and interpretation.2" Article 27 prohibits a state from invoking domes-
tic law to justify a failure to implement a treaty.29 A treaty enters into
24. See Declaration on the Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Economic or Politi-
cal Coercion in Concluding a Treaty, U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
285, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/I/Add.2 (1971).
25. Id. at 64; see Malawer, A New Concept of Consent and World Public Order:
"Coerced Treaties" and the Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1 (1970) (criticizing article 52 in light of the existence of many small "new
states").
26. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 62; see J. SINCLAIR, supra note 12,
at 192 (discussing the historical development of "change of circumstance").
27. J. SINCLAIR, supra note 12, at 192. Although of ancient origin, this custom
remains controversial. Id. The ease with which one party to an agreement may legiti-
mately claim a change in circumstance endangers the sanctity of all treaties. Id. at
193. Treaty termination under this principle, however, is limited. Vienna Convention,
supra note 10, at art. 62; see T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 112 (1985) (discussing fundamental change in circumstance as a form of
invalidity).
28. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18; (examining Interna-
tional Court of Justice's interpretation of fundamental change in circumstance); see
also Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at arts. 26-38 (discussing fundamental change
in circumstance).
29. See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 27; see also T. BUERGENTHAL &
H. MAIER, supra note 27, at 104 (discussing the general necessity of observing
treaties).
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force binding the parties if each party satisfies its own procedure for
treaty conclusion. This procedure exists notwithstanding the fact that a
treaty's substance conflicts with a party's constitutional law.30
2. Interpreting Bilateral Treaties
Although article 27 technically binds parties to a treaty, different
interpretations of an international agreement often threaten treaty ad-
herence. 1 Disputes over the meaning of a specific word in the treaty's
official text usually arise because of language difficulties,32 and of the
problems of determining the parties' true intent concerning deliberately
vague clauses or phrases.33When the meaning of a clause or phrase cre-
ates an ambiguous or unreasonable obligation for a party, the Vienna
Convention stresses that the parties shall interpret the treaty in accor-
dance with the "ordinary meaning" of the clause or phrase u and in
"light of its object and purpose." 35 After evaluating a treaty's text, a
third party tribunal can attempt to decipher the parties' intent by stud-
ying supplementary information," such as preparatory work for the
treaty and the party's behavior subsequent to treaty enactment.37
The Vienna Convention emphasizes that a treaty authenticated in
two or more languages possesses equal authority in each language38
30. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 27. For example, if the United States
ratifies a treaty with Canada, and part of the treaty prohibits United States citizens
from publicly demonstrating in the United States against Canadian policies, the United
States may not claim in an international tribunal that the treaty violates the domestic
law of the United States to justify failing to honor the treaty.
31. See T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MATER,'supra note 27, at 105 (discussing "ordi-
nary meaning" and "special meaning").
32. See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 33 (noting that concluding par-
ties generally authenticate as official the text of the agreement in respective languages);
see also J. SINCLAIR, supra note 12, at 147 (discussing interpretation of plurilingual
treaties); HUNGDAH CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAw OF
TREATIES 72 (1972) (discussing the Chinese Communist view of treaty interpretation).
33. J. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
1144 (1974).
34. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 31(1); see J. SINCLAIR, supra note
12, at 121 (considering consequences that normally and reasonably flow from the text).
35. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 31; see J. SINCLAIR, supra note 12,
at 119 (stating that parties must apply the same standard of good faith to interpret and
observe a treaty).
36. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 32; see J. SINCLAIR, supra note 12,
at 143 (defining supplementary means of interpretation as including documentation of
negotiations prior to treaty conclusion). Negotiating documents are often misleading,
however, because clarifying negotiations frequently occur off the record. Id. at 143.
37. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 32.
38. Id. at art. 33. Unity of a treaty and its terms in plurilingual agreements safe-
guards each party by combining the principle of equal authority of authentic texts with
the presumption that the terms mean the same thing in each text. Report of the Inter-
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When authentic texts possess a different meaning not clarified by sup-
plementary means of interpretation, the most reasonable meaning ap-
plies. 9 When concluding parties fail to agree on a common interpreta-
tion, however, the Vienna Convention proposes that they present the
discrepancy for resolution to either the International Court of Justice
or a neutral arbitration panel. 0
The Vienna Convention's treaty termination and interpretation provi-
sions codify Western notions of customary international law.4 1 Con-
cepts such as coercive force, fundamental change in circumstance, and
third party adjudication exemplify Western perception of international
treaty law. Comparing Western views of treaty law with those of the
PRC provides the necessary insight into how the PRC would treat a
bilateral agreement such as the Joint Declaration.
II. PRC Treaty Practice
A. EVOLUTION OF PRC's LEGAL SYSTEM
To compare the Western notion of treaty law with PRC notions, it is
necessary to understand the PRC's legal system and the role that it
plays in the PRC's interpretation of international law.
The PRC's legal system evolved from Confucian ideology42 and post
World War II Soviet practice.4 3 The PRC's original legal system relied
national Law Commission to the General Assembly, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at
ch. 4, U.N. Doc. A/6009 (1966), reprinted in 1966 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 225, U.N.
Doc. A/Cn.4/Ser./1966/Add. 1.
39. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 33. See Maurommatis Palestine
Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 2, at 19 (defining "reasonable" as most harmo-
nious to the object and purpose understood by parties to the treaty).
40. See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 66. Under the annex to the Vi-
enna Convention, the procedures established for forming a conciliation board facilitate
the disputing parties' search for an arbitration panel. Id.
41. See generally J. SINCLAIR, supra note 12 (discussing treaty termination and
interpretation).
42. See G. SCOTT, CHINESE TREATIES 42 (1975) [hereinafter cited as G. ScoTr];
L. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 133-63 (1969) (noting that Con-
fucian ideology defines the state's role through the dichotomy of the terms li and fa);
Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE
INDIVIDUAL 27 (M. Katz ed. 1957). The term fa, having negative connotations, repre-
sents law. Id. Under Confucianism, the implementation of law is used to punish those
committing the most serious crimes. Id. at 31. Instead of fa, the Confucianists rely
upon li, which represents a code of conduct amongst individuals. Id. at 27. All relation-
ships in Chinese society, such as father/son or employer/employee, are governed by a
standard of propriety. Id. When one defies this standard, the person faces ridicule and
admonishment from peers. Such fear of admonishment effectively maintains public or-
der. Id. at 30.
43. See G. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 42-45 (discussing the ways in which Chinese
law resembles Soviet law, particularly during the 1950's).
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on the "rule of man," as opposed to the "rule of law," defining social
order largely according to relationships between individuals. 4 As in the
Soviet Union, the Communist Party took control of the PRC judicial
system 5 Consequently, in both the PRC and the Soviet Union, the
ruling party disregarded constitutional rights at its discretion.'
Similar to its treatment of domestic law, the PRC used international
law as a political instrument to realize Communist Party goals.4 PRC
commentators acknowledged the primacy of national self-interest in the
PRC's philosophy of international law:
If [international law] is useful to our country, to socialist enterprise, or to the
peace enterprise of the world, we will use it. However, if this instrument is disad-
vantageous to our country, to socialist enterprises or to peace enterprises of the
people of the world, we will not use it.,'
Thus, the PRC embraced the idea of the illimitable sovereignty,' 0
advocating the use of international law to promote the country's politi-
cal policies.50 The doctrine of illimitable sovereignty, which the PRC
adopted from early Soviet influences,' prohibits states from infringing
on PRC sovereignty and also prohibits the PRC from infringing on
other states' sovereignty.5 2 This doctrine supports the PRC's belief that
44. Id. at 42. "Rule of man" traditionally refers to social order maintained by the
leadership's subjective directives created to solve particular problems. See DEBARRY,
SOURCES OF CHMNEsE TRADITION 15-30, 86-121 (1960) (discussing Confucian govern-
ment and tradition); see also G. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 41 (noting that the "rule of
law" refers to the institutionalization of social order and codifies principles to express
desired conduct for individuals interacting in society); DEBARRY, supra at 122-48 (dis-
cussing Han Fei Tzu, Li Ssu, and legalism generally).
45. G. Scor, supra note 42, at 45.
46. Id. at 44.
47. See HUNGDAH CHIU, The Nature of International Law and the Problem of a
Universal System, in LAw IN CHINESE FOREIGN POuCY: COMIUNIST CMNA AND SE-
LEcTE)D PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Shao-Chuan Leng & Hungdah Chiu
eds. 1972) (stating that the PRC agrees with the Soviet view that international law,
like municipal law, should be a state's foreign policy instrument).
48. See LAw IN CMHNESE FOREIGN PoLicy, supra note 47, at 3, citing Refute the
Absurd Theory Concerning International Law by Ch'en T'i-ch'lang, Jen-min jing pao
(People's Daily), Sept. 18, 1957 (describing the left wing's use of international law in
the PRC during the 1950's).
49. See G. ScoTT, supra note 42, at 47-50 (stating that the PRC is unwilling to
compromise its state sovereignty for Western considerations).
50. See G. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 97 (discussing that like the Chinese, most
Western nations adopt a policy promoting self-interest); L. SCIENMAN & 1. WIucIN-
SOM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL CRIsIS (1968) (giving specific examples of
this type of behavior).
51. See G. ScoTT, supra note 42, at 47 (discussing the PRC adoption of Soviet
practices).
52. See Vamvoukos, Chinese and Soviet Attitudes toward International Law: A
Cooperative Approach, 5 REv. SOCIALIST L. 131, 136 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Vamvoukos] (stating the PRC perceives the West as using aggression and exploitation
19861
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it has an absolute right to make independent decisions concerning its
internal and external affairs. 8
Like the Soviets, who adapted their concept of sovereignty to accom-
modate the international community," the PRC recently recognized
various traditional sources of international law,ss such as treaties and
customs.80 PRC writers now emphasize that treaties are important for
governing relations between ideologically diverse nations.8 As evidence
of the PRC's recent acceptance of traditional international law,8 8 the
to violate the sovereignty of other states). See also J. HSIUNG, LAW AND PoLIcY IN
CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 73 (1972) [hereinafter cited as J. HSIUNG] (citing
PRC's claim that the United States' actions in North Korea during the Korean War as
an example of such Western aggression).
53. See G. ScoTT, supra note 42, at 47 (stating Marxist theory treats sovereignty
as a ploy by capitalist jurists to conceal the class nature of state dictatorship); see also
J. HSIUNG, supra note 52, at 73 (noting the PRC uses this hard line theory to shield
itself from past ills). The PRC still fears submitting to the "imperialist" nature of the
West. Id.
54. See INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (F.I. Kozhevnikov ed. n.d.), reprinted in G. Scorr,
supra note 42, at 47.
55. Vamvoukos, supra note 52, at 138. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice sets forth the following traditional sources of international law:
"a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions." STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38(1).
56. Vamvoukos, supra note 52, at 139; see HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 3
(stating that PRC textbooks offer little information pertaining to the PRC's perception
of general legal principles as acceptable sources of international law). The PRC histori-
cally did not accept traditional sources of international law, such as treaties and cus-
toms because to do so implied that the PRC accepted Western political systems. Id.
Western ideology contradicted the Marxist-Maoist ideology. Id. at 140. See Ying T'ao,
Recognize the True Face of Bourgeois International Law from a Few Basic Concepts,
I STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS 46, 47 (1960), cited in HUNGDAH CHIU,
supra note 32, at 2. The Chinese scholar, Ying T'ao, explains this contradiction: "the
substantive sources of bourgeois international law are the external policy of the bour-
geoisie, which is also the will of the ruling class of those big capitalist powers." Id. T'ao
concludes that the formal use of sources of international law acts as a smoke screen for
Western nations' true intentions: the perpetuation of class character. Id. The PRC's
perceptions of international law, however, do appear in a limited sense in the PRC's
treaties and legal arguments. Id. at 3. For example, in defense of the PRC's right of
sovereignty over Taiwan, PRC writers invoke the principle of ex injurica jus no critur
which prevents the acquisition of a right through an illegal act. Vamvoukos, supra note
52, at 140.
57. See WANG YAO-T'IEN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 10
(1958), reprinted in G. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 60 (absent a treaty, the PRC could
face situations in which Western countries invoke customs that conflict with the PRC's
perception of international law); LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN PoLicY, supra note 47, at
11 (noting that the PRC avoids the conflicts that could arise in this situation by recog-
nizing treaties as valid sources of international law).
58. G. ScoTT, supra note 42, at 61. Between 1949 and 1974 the PRC concluded
over 2,000 treaties. Id. Between 1975 and 1980, the PRC concluded 580 bilateral and
25 multilateral agreements. See HUNGDAH CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S RE-
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PRC significantly increased the number of formal agreements it con-
cluded between 1970 and 1980, making it a leading treaty-maker.o
Prior to the PRC's acceptance into the United Nations in 1971,00 the
Republic of China was the sole representative of the Chinese people in
the United Nations.61 Upon instatement into the United Nations, the
PRC proclaimed that it was not obligated to honor earlier treaties or
conventions signed by the Republic of China.62 Rather than becoming
a party to Republic of China's treaties or conventions, the PRC inde-
pendently adopted the substance of many of these treaties or conven-
tions." The PRC rationalized adopting such treaties or conventions,
finding that these agreements merely crystallized peremptory norms.64
The PRC's reaction to the Vienna Convention demonstrates how the
PRC selectively accedes to various treaty provisions without formally
ratifying the treaty itself. The Republic of China negotiated and signed
the Vienna Convention before the United Nations had accepted the
PRC, thereby excluding the PRC from becoming a signatory to the
treaty. 5 The PRC refused to ratify the Vienna Convention, even after
it was accepted into the United Nations. 6 Instead, the PRC follows
PUBLIC OF CHINA 118-221 (1981).
59. G. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 61.
60. On October 25, 1971 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
Resolution 2758 restoring the PRC as the only lawful representative of the Chinese
people in the United Nations. G.A. Res. 2758, 26 U.N. GAOR (1976th plen. mtg.) at
36, U.N. Doc. A/L. 632 (1971) (hereinafter cited as G.A. Res. 2758].
61. The Republic of China represented the Chinese people in the United Nations
from September 28, 1945 to October 25, 1971. G.A. Res. 2758, supra note 60. This is
significant because only United Nations member states may sign multilateral treaties
concluded under United Nations guidance. See Vamvoukos, supra note 52, at 139 (not-
ing that until its instatement in 1971, the PRC could not validly accede to a multilat-
eral treaty concluded under United Nations guidance).
62. On September 29, 1972 the Secretary General of the United Nations received a
communication from the PRC's Minister of Foreign Affairs stating:
with regard to the multilateral treaties signed ratified or acceded to by the de-
funct Chinese government before the establishment of the PRC, my government
will examine their contents before making a decision in the light of the circum-
stances as to whether or not they should be recognized.
Materials, 1985 Chinese-American Summer Law Program, ch. 5, item 12-3 (unpub-
lished, C. Grossman ed.) (available at the editorial offices of the American University
Journal of International Law and Policy, Washington, D.C.).
63. Vamvoukos, supra note 52, at 139.
64. Id. The PRC believes that many principles found in multilateral treaties incor-
porate traditional international law customs. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying
text (discussing the PRC's treatment of the Vienna Convention).
65. The Vienna Convention opened for signature before the PRC's acceptance into
the United Nations in 1971. See supra note 60 (discussing the PRC's acceptance into
the United Nations); MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 12, at 695, 702 (noting that
at the Vienna Convention, the Republic of China acted as the representative for the
Chinese people signing the document on April 27, 1970).
66. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 12, at 695.
1986]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
those Vienna Convention provisions which it deems as existing princi-
ples of international custom.67
For example, the PRC follows the Vienna Convention's basic provi-
sions on treaty interpretation and termination on the grounds that they
represent international custom.68 Because the PRC identified and ad-
hered to the customary norms of treaty interpretation and termination,
and because it did not ratify the Vienna Convention, the PRC is not
bound by the remaining Vienna Convention guidelines. The PRC en-
joys the prerogative of defining these provisions according to its na-
tional self-interest.
The following section identifies how the PRC defines treaty termina-
tion and interpretation and then compares those definitions to Western
notions of those two concepts.
B. THE PRC's USE OF TREATY TERMINATION
1. Terminating a Treaty Under the Theory of Unequal Treaty
Like the West, the PRC adopts the notion of treaty termination. The
PRC sanctions treaty termination under the coercive measure theory 9
and unequal treaty doctrine.70 The unequal treaty doctrine defines ine-
quality as a treaty creating nonreciprocal obligations 1 or a treaty con-
cluded by coercive measures.7 2 In contrast to the Vienna Convention's
narrow and vague definition of coercive force, the PRC's interpretation
67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (explaining the PRC's beliefs regard-
ing the status of multilateral treaties).
68. See HUNGDAH CHIu, supra note 32, at 72-120 (discussing the PRC's treatment
of treaty interpretation and termination).
69. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (describing the coercive measure
theory under the Vienna Convention).
70. HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 60-71. The Nationalist Chinese employed
the unequal treaty theory in the 1920's to attack earlier treaties concluded by China
with Western powers who received most-favored-nation treatment, territorial cessions,
and favorable tariff regulations. Id. In 1928, the Nationalists requested that all of these
"unequal treaties" be renegotiated. J. HsiUNG, supra note 52, at 252; see also TYo-
KAo, THE TERMINATION TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1933) (analyzing the Na-
tionalist Chinese concept of unequal treaties); infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text
(discussing the PRC's use of unequal treaties).
71. See Ying T'ao, Recognize the True Face of Bourgeois International Law from
a few Basic Concepts, I STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS 46, 47 (1960), trans-
lated in HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 5 (stating that "where treaties are con-
cluded with capitalist countries in accordance with self serving needs of bourgeoisie,
the substance of these treaties must be scrutinized"). The PRC maintains that when
negotiating with a Western nation, questioning the reciprocity of a treaty's obligations
is a method of checking the Western nation's motives. Id.
72. See G. ScoTT, supra note 42, at 90 (stating that the PRC included the idea of
coercion in the concept of inequality of parties); see also supra notes 22-25 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Vienna Convention's definition of coercive force).
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of coercive force prohibits states from imposing political and economic
sanctions on another state to procure a treaty.73 The PRC's theory
sanctioning treaty termination also differs from the Vienna Convention
on the issue of substantive textual inequality.74 Although the Vienna
Convention does not recognize substantive textual inequality as grounds
for invalidating a treaty, the PRC does.7 5 The PRC, therefore, looks
beyond a treaty's language and considers the benefits that it confers on
each of the concluding parties to determine whether the treaty is
valid.71 In addition to the PRC's acceptance of the unequal doctrine to
terminate a treaty, the PRC also adopts the Western concept of funda-
mental change of circumstance.
2. Terminating a Treaty Under the Theory of Fundamental Change
in Circumstance
The PRC's application of fundamental change of circumstance to in-
validate a treaty, however, differs from the definition expounded in the
Vienna Convention.77 The PRC recognizes that a fundamental change
73. G. ScoTT, supra note 42, at 91.
74. See id. at 92 (stating that under PRC notions of treaty law, treaties should be
based on "equal" and "reciprocal" considerations that include relevant political and
economic facts).
75. See id. (stating that treaties in the PRC should be based on "equal" and "re-
ciprocal" considerations, including relevant political and economic facts).
76. HUNGDAH Cmu, supra note 32, at 64; 1946 Sino-American Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation, November 4, 1946, Republic of China-United States,
63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871. The PRC considers the treaty unequal, even though
on its face the treaty confers mutual benefit to each country (including encouraging
both nations to establish factories and increase commerce with one another). Id. At the
treaty's conclusion, however, China's economic strength hardly matched that of the
post-war United States. HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 63. Nationalist China
lacked the capabilities to conduct even a fraction of the business in the United States
compared to United States' business conducted in China. Id. The PRC also character-
izes treaties to which it is not a party as unequal. Id. See generally Huang Yu, Such
Cooperation, People's Daily, Dec. 31, 1956, at 1, col. 2 (citing the PRC's declaring
unequal the 1956 United States-Switzerland Agreement on Cooperation Concerning
Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, 8 U.S.T. 91, T.I.A.S. No. 3745, on the grounds that the
United States supplies the Swiss with nuclear material, but reserves the right to super-
vise and procure inventions produced from the use of this material).
77. See Noonan, Revolutions and Treaty Termination, 2 DICK. J. INT'L L. 301,
313 (1984) (stating that the PRC views the 1949 Revolution as a fundamental change
of circumstance). The Vienna Convention does not consider changes in internal law
sufficient to justify abrogation of a treaty. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text (discussing the fundamental change in circumstance doctrine under the Vienna
Convention); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at arts. 60-62 (giving other
reasons for invalidating treaties, which include material breach and impossibility of
performance).
Despite the PRC's acceptance of the Vienna Convention's theory of material breach
to unilaterally abrogate a treaty, the PRC occasionally decides not to terminate a
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of circumstance is valid grounds for treaty termination, 78 but argues
that Western nations use the theory as a "capitalist" pretext to unilat-
erally abrogate unfavorable agreements. 9
PRC theorists suggest that rather than systematically terminating
treaties, states should resolve disputes through diplomatic consultation,
including revising or reconcluding treaties to incorporate changes.80
PRC jurisprudence offers little guidance, however, for determining
which changes in circumstance trigger negotiation rather than treaty
abrogation.81 It is therefore difficult to determine the magnitude of a
change of circumstance justifying terminating a treaty.82 The PRC's
preference for negotiation, rather than termination, leads to problems
in treaty interpretation.
C. PRC PRACTICE OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
Most of the difficulties arising from concluding treaties with the
PRC involve disputes regarding interpretation, rather than termination,
treaty under such circumstances. In 1966, the PRC and the Soviet Union agreed not to
require citizens of either country to produce vaccination certificates upon entering the
other country. J. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 33, at 515. The Soviets subse-
quently announced their decision to require all Chinese citizens entering the Soviet
Union to have proof of smallpox vaccination. Id. The PRC claimed violation of this
agreement but nevertheless, continued to honor the agreement. Id.
On the other hand, the PRC frequently employs the theory of impossibility of per-
formance to terminate treaties. The PRC abrogated the Sino-Soviet Cultural Coopera-
tion Agreement, under this theory. July 5, 1956, U.S.S.R.-PRC, V Chung-hua jen-
min Kung-ho-kuo t'iao-yueh-chi, 1956, 152-54 (1958), 263 U.N.T.S. 129 (strengthen-
ing cooperation between the two countries in the spheres of science, technology, educa-
tion, literature, art, public health, physical culture, journalism, publishing, broadcast-
ing, television, and in other cultural spheres). The PRC claimed that during its 1966
Cultural Revolution, it closed its schools under a state of emergency. J. HsiUNG, supra
note 52, at 248-49. Therefore, due to circumstances beyond its control, the PRC sent
all Soviet students home. To the PRC, this suspension of studies constituted a legiti-
mate supervening cause justifying terminating its treaty obligation. Id.
78. Chou Keng Sheng, Looking at the West Berlin Question from the Angle of
International Law, I STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS 44 (1959), translated in
HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 103.
79. WANG YAO T'IEN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 15
(1958), translated in HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 103 [hereinafter cited as
WANG]. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress possesses the
power to decide on the ratification or abrogation of important agreements concluded
with foreign states. P.R.C. CONST. art. 67(14) (1982).
80. HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 104; see L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL
LAW 947 (8th ed. 1955) (claiming Western nations invoke this doctrine based on polit-
ical motivations). Although the practical importance of fundamental change in circum-
stance may at times be exaggerated by the West, nations dissatisfied with the status
quo frequently use this theory to escape burdensome treaties. Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 707 (1969).
81. J. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 33, at 104.
82. Id.
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of various agreements.83 The PRC adheres to the Vienna Convention's
provisions recognizing preparatory work for treaty interpretation." In
disputes arising from the meaning of a word appearing in different
texts, the PRC, like the signatories to the Vienna Convention, concedes
that both texts possess equal authority, 5 but maintains that there is
only one official meaning.88 The PRC follows the principle of in dubio
mitius7 when preparatory work fails to resolve interpretational dis-
putes. Under the in dubio mitius principle, the PRC interprets disputed
terms in a way that is less onerous for the party assuming an
obligation. 88
The 1955 Agreed Announcement between the PRC and the United
States" typifies the PRC's interpretational dispute procedure 0 The
1955 Agreed Announcement provided for the release of each country's
nationals from the other state.9 1 A dispute arose as to the interpretation
of Article 3 which provided that: "the PRC recognizes that Americans
in the PRC who desire to return to the United States are entitled to do
so. The PRC has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures
so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return."9 2 The
United States claimed that Article 3 extended to all United States citi-
zens in the PRC, including those detained in Chinese prisons. 3
The PRC rejected the United States' position, and applied the agree-
83. HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 72. The Chinese writer, Lin Hsin, identifies
this problem as "sleeping in the same bed but dreaming different dreams." Id.
84. J. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHiu, supra note 33, at 1214; see HUNGDAH CHIU,
supra note 32, at 84 (stating that prepatory work is a generally accepted rule in treaty
interpretation); Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 32 (outlining the Conven-
tion's support of prepatory work in treaty interpretation).
85. WANG, supra note 79, at 11-14, translated in J. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU,
supra note 33, at 1162-64.
86. See J. COHEN & HUNGDAH CIu, supra note 33, at 1210 (discussing problems
of language barriers in treaty interpretation).
87. HUNGDAH Cmu, supra note 32, at 85. Literally translated, this principle
means in doubtful cases, the mild one applies. Id.
88. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 80, at 953; see HUNGDAH CHiu, supra note 32, at
85 (stating that the Chinese prefer the principle of In dublo mitius because it adds
justification to its desire to limit infringement upon its sovereign rights).
89. Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of the United States of America
and the People's Republic of China, Sept. 10, 1955, 33 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 844, 846
(Sept. 19, 1955) (providing for the release of each country's nationals from the other
nation).
90. HUNGDAH CHIu, supra note 32, at 82.
91. Agreed Announcement, supra note 89.
92. Id. at art. 3(1).
93. See Continued Detention of U.S. Civilians by Communist China, 33 DEP'T ST.
BULL 1049-50 (Dec. 26, 1955). The United States asserted that "the declaration is
simple, clear, and positive. It says that any United States citizen has the right to leave
China .... No distinction is made as between those in prison and those out of
prison."
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ment only to imprisoned American PRC residents.94 The Chinese fol-
lowed the norms of international practice and consulted the 1955
Agreed Announcement's negotiating history to support its positionY
The PRC contended that the United States raised, and the PRC re-
jected, the prisoner issue during negotiations. 8 The PRC prevailed and
persuaded the United States to abandon its demand that all Americans
living in the PRC be entitled to return to the United States.97
The PRC's and the United States' negotiation of the 1955 Agreed
Announcements' interpretation also demonstrates the PRC's position
concerning language disputes. During negotiations, the United States
and the PRC disagreed over the timing of the release of American ci-
vilians.98 The final English version of the 1955 Agreed Announcement
required "expeditious" release, while the corresponding Chinese text
enabled the PRC to act less promptly.99 The PRC determined that the
Agreement's preparatory work failed to support either side's interpreta-
tion and interpreted the Agreement accordingly to in dubio mitius, and
argued that a less demanding standard than "expeditious" should ap-
ply.100 The PRC withheld releasing some American civilians until fif-
teen years later.101
The PRC's behavior during the dispute over the 1955 Agreed An-
94. See R. YOUNG, NEGOTIATING WITH CHINESE COMMUNISTS: THE UNITED
STATES EXPERIENCE, 1953-1967, 81 (1968) (observing that the Chinese claimed a dis-
tinction between "ordinary American residents" and "those who offended against the
law"); see also HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 83 (noting that the PRC agreed
that the future disposition of Chinese prisoners remained within its sovereignty and was
not viewed as a matter susceptible to intervention by outside states).
95. HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 83; see supra note 36 and accompanying
text (discussing the application of negotiating history by the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties).
96. Ho Yang, U.S. Stonewalling at Geneva, 16 PEOPLE'S CHINA 13-14 (1956).
During the Geneva talks the United States demanded the release of all American na-
tionals, including spies and law breakers. Id. The PRC contended that a "country pos-
sesses the inviolable sovereign right to deal with law-breaking aliens according to its
own law." Id. Accordingly, the American representative, Ambassador Johnson, finally
agreed to this principle. Id.
97. HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 84. As a result, the PRC held American
prisoners in China from the time of the Agreed Announcement until the early 1970's.
Id.
98. See G. ScoTt, supra note 42, at 38 (stating that the United States delegation
wanted civilians released immediately, while the Chinese delegation wanted indefinite
delay).
99. The Chinese term jin-su conveys the sense of utmost speed inherent in the word
"expeditious", yet inappropriately translates the connotation of efficacy which distin-
guishes "expeditious" from the phrase "very quickly." J. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU,
supra note 33, at 1144.
100. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (defining the term in dubio Witius).
101. See HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 84 (stating that Americans were still
being held when the book was published in 1972).
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nouncement indicates that the PRC advocates negotiation as the most
appropriate method of dispute resolution.'0 2 Nonetheless, the PRC ref-
uses to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or
neutral arbitration tribunals 0 3 because it disfavors using third party
adjudication to settle international disagreements in cases of public in-
ternational law.104 The PRC, however, did relinquish some control over
dispute resolution in the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement 0 5 by con-
senting to the creation of a commission to supervise the Armistice
Agreement's performance.108 The commission, comprised of representa-
tives from two communist and two neutral Western countries, followed
the rule of unanimity, 07 to ensure that the Armistice Agreement was
interpreted thoroughly and fairly.108
D. SUMIARY OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRC TREATY
PRACTICE AND THE PRACTICE EMBODIED IN THE
VIENNA CONVENTION
A comparison of the PRC's treatment of bilateral treaty law under
international custom to Western treatment of treaty law under the Vi-
enna Convention reveals that PRC theories differ from Western theo-
ries. The PRC and Western theories vary on three points regarding
treaty termination. First, the PRC's definition of coercion includes eco-
nomic or political aggression,10 9 whereas Western countries have not
102. G. Scorr, supra note 42, at 132.
103. See HUNGDAH CHIu, supra note 32, at 83 (noting that the PRC disfavors any
method of dispute resolution that might potentially limit its sovereignty); 1979-1980
I.C.J.Y.B. 87-88 (1980) (describing the structure and composition of the International
Court of Justice). Therefore, even though the PRC, as a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council, appoints a member to the International Court of
Justice, it refuses to accept that Court's jurisdiction. Id.
104. See Lockett, Dispute Settlement in People's Republic of China: The Develop-
ing Role of Arbitration in Foreign Trade and Maritime Disputes, 16 G.W. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 239-69 (1982) (discussing the PRC's treatment of arbitration in private law);
see also Houzhi, Arbitration a Method Used by China to Settle Foreign Trade and
Economic Disputes, 4 PACE L. Rzv. 519-36 (1984) (discussing arbitration in interna-
tional context).
105. Korean Armistice Agreement, July 27, 1953, People's Republic of Korea-Peo-
ple's Republic of China, United Nations 4 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2781, 472
U.N.T.S. 36 [hereinafter cited as Armistice Agreement].
106. See HUNGDAH Cmu, supra note 32, at 77 (discussing the Armistice
Agreement).
107. See id. at 77 (listing the four countries involved: Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Switzerland, and Sweden).
108. Id. at 78.
109. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (describing the PRC's definition of
coercive force).
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decided whether to accept this liberal concept. 10 Second, the PRC ap-
proves of treaty termination for substantive textual inequality, a prac-
tice that Western nations do not permit."' Third, the PRC prefers to
consult before abrogating a treaty under the fundamental change in
circumstance doctrine." 2 Western countries, in contrast, consider fun-
damental changes to be a basis for automatic termination." 3
With the exception of dispute resolution, the PRC and the Western
countries have similar theories of treaty interpretation. Unlike the
West, the PRC almost always refuses to submit public law disputes to
third party adjudicatory tribunals. The PRC, therefore, resolves its
treaty disputes, through consultation." 4 This comparison of PRC and
Western acceptance of third party adjudication in particular, and PRC
and Western treaty practice in general, foreshadows the Joint Declara-
tion's potential for success.
III. The Signing of Joint Declaration
Proper evaluation of the Joint Declaration's binding effect also re-
quires an understanding of the political circumstances leading up to
and surrounding the document's signing as well as the document's basic
provisions. Pertinent events preceding the Joint Declaration's signing
include the Gang of Four's arrest in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping's emer-
gence in 1978 as the Communist Party's leader." 5 The PRC entered an
I10. See generally G. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 90 (distinguishing both Chinese
view and Declaration on Prohibition of Military, Political, or Economic Coercion in the
Conclusion of Treaties from Vienna Convention viewpoint as expressed by article 52.
Declaration on Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic Coercion in Conclusion of
Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/26 (1969)).
111. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (outlining the PRC's use of
substantive textual inequality).
112. See HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 104 (explaining the PRC's use of fun-
damental change in circumstance).
113. See J. SINCLAIR, supra note 12, at 192 (describing fundamental change in
circumstance under the Vienna Convention).
114. See J. COAEN & HUNGDAH CHIu, supra note 33, at 1206-07 (explaining the
PRC's philosophy concerning third party adjudication).
115. Prior to Deng Xiaoping's acquisition of control of the Communist Party, Mao-
tse-tung and his inner council, known as the Gang of Four, comprised the PRC's lead-
ership. See generally T. White, China: Burnout of a Revolution, 13 TIME 30 (Sept. 26,
1983) (outlining China's political history from 1945 to present). With Mao's death and
the Gang of Four's subsequent arrest in 1976, a two year power struggle ensued. Id. By
1978, Deng Xiaoping emerged as the country's leader. Id.; see J. FAIRBANK, THE
UNITED STATES AND CHINA, supra note 2 at 417 (discussing political developments of
Mao and the Gang of Four from 1962-76); J. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POUT-
ics (1980) (framing Chinese political milieu); A. CHAN, ON SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY
AND THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM (1985) (documenting origins and events surrounding
Liyizhe debates).
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age of reform, upon Deng's rise to power.
Deng emphasized modernizing the Chinese economy by encouraging
Western investment 116 and deemphasizing central control. This policy
gives industry greater self-determination regarding pricing, wages, pro-
duction and development.1
Deng advocates improving Chinese domestic productivity through in-
creasing the supply of Western capital and technology218 For many
years, the PRC has used Hong Kong to facilitate Western contact with
the PRC.119 Using this commercial center as a free port to send exports
to other countries1 20 and allowing forty-five percent of its total imports
to enter Hong Kong, the PRC derives one-third of its gross convertible
foreign exchange earnings from Hong King.
1 21
In light of the financial importance of Hong Kong to the PRC, West-
em investors and Hong Kong business persons feared that the PRC
would fully and unilaterally annex Hong Kong in 1997.122 The poten-
tial for Communist control caused the value of the Hong Kong dollar
to fall dramatically on the world market.12 3 As a consequence, Hong
Kong suffered serious economic problems and faced political uncer-
tainty.12 4 To reduce this uncertainty, the PRC and Great Britain nego-
116. Bonavia, Socialist Balancing Act, 130 FAR EAST. Eco. Rav. 36 (1985) [here-
inafter cited as Bonavia, Socialist Balancing Act]. In addition to Deng's efforts to in-
crease support from the international community, he recently moved to ensure the suc-
cess of his program by enlisting further cooperation from his own government.
Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1985 at Al, col. 2. Deng and Party General Secretary Hu
Yaobang asked for and received the resignation of sixty-four senior members of the
central committee and ten members of the Politburo. Id. The leaders replaced them
with younger and more educated bureaucrats sympathetic to economic reform. Id.
117. Bonavia, Socialist Balancing Act, supra note 115, at 36. Industry's self-deter-
mination remains limited. Lewis & Ottley, China's Developing Labor Law 59 \VAsH.
U.L.Q. 1165, 1168 (1982). Although the central government no longer directly ap-
points plant managers, the government maintains control, retaining the right to ap-
prove appointments of plant managers. Id. at 1183.
118. See N. MINERS, supra note 4, at 23 (emphasizing economic benefit of western
technology to the PRC).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 27. The PRC uses Hong Kong as a means of trading with countries
such as Indonesia with whom it maintains hostile relations. See 64 FAR EAsT ECON.
REv. 62 (1980) (describing PRC-Indonesia trade through Hong Kong). Direct trade
between Indonesia and the PRC ceased after the military coup in Indonesia in 1965.
Id.
121. N. MINERS, supra note 4, at 21-22.
122. D. BONAVIA, supra note 1, at 59.
123. Id. at 78. The rate of exchange of the Hong Kong dollar fell in relation to the
United States dollar from 6:1 in 1982 to 7.8:1 in 1983. Id. On October 15, 1983 the
Hong Kong Government protected the currency by pegging it to the United States
dollar at an exchange of $7.8 Hong Kong dollars to $I.00 U.S. Id.
124. Id. at 79. Among the more significant effects created by the uncertainty of a
PRC annexation were the abandonment of a project to build a new airport, construc-
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tiated the Joint Declaration as an orderly settlement to the problem.12
The Joint Declaration transfers sovereignty over Hong Kong from
Britain to the Chinese on July 1, 1997.126 The Joint Declaration, how-
ever, limits the PRC's control over Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration
requires the PRC to give Hong Kong's residents influence in choosing
their own government, either by direct election or through consulta-
tion. 27 In addition, the PRC may not change the region's social and
economic system for forty-nine years after the treaty takes effect. 2 8
Further, the PRC may not levy taxes, 20 maintain public order, 30 or
inhibit the free flow of capital in Hong Kong."3' Finally, the Joint Dec-
laration provides for continued private possession of land 32 and a
peaceful and orderly transfer of government in 1997 through the estab-
lishment of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group. 33
The Joint Liaison Group represents the core benefit of the signing of
the Joint Declaration. The PRC and Great Britain both agreed that it
is in their best interest to ensure an orderly transfer of government in
1997. The PRC realized that its modernization plans were dependent
on Hong Kong'3 and Great Britain realized that it needed to protect
tion project for business offices and housing, and a fear that banks would close as
businesses withdrew funds. Id.
125. Joint Declaration, supra note 3. See generally D. BONAVIA, supra note I (dis-
cussing the political events leading up to the signing of the Joint Declaration).
126. The PRC considers the Joint Declaration a formal international agreement.
HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 14. The PRC entitles its most important docu-
ments, such as agreements regulating political or economic relations between con-
tracting states, "treaties". Id. A "declaration," is normally a document that only pro-
vides for general principles of international relations. Id. The Joint Declaration's title,
however, is more a result of semantics than an indication of the information it contains.
A Question of Semantics, 116 FAR EAST. ECON. REv. 16 (1984). The PRC consist-
ently argues that the three treaties transferring Hong Kong's control to Great Britain
are illegitimate. See supra note 3 (discussing the conclusion of these treaties). The
PRC loses face by labelling the Joint Declaration a treaty instead of a declaration.
Therefore, the PRC believes it currently possesses a lawful right to control Hong Kong.
By concluding a treaty stipulating the manner in which Great Britain will permit the
PRC to control Hong Kong in 1997, the PRC formally admits to the world that the
PRC relinquished its right to Britain in the 1800's to control Hong Kong. Comment,
Legal Aspects of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong, 22
TEx. INTL L. REv. 167 (1985).
127. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at art. 4.
128. Id. at art. 5. The forty-nine year period begins July 1, 1997 and ends June 30,
2046. Id.
129. Id. at art. 8.
130. Id. at art. 11.
131. Id. at art. 7.
132. See id. at annex 3 (stating that leases and all rights related to such leases will
continue to be recognized and protected).
133. Id. at annex 2.
134. See N. MINERS, supra note 4, at 23 (discussing PRC's economic dependence
on Hong Korig); see also Kamm, Importing Some of Hong Kong - Exporting Some of
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its own business interests 80 and retain a good rapport with the Hong
Kong people and the international community. The parties thus signed
the Joint Declaration to give the PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong
while placing limitations upon the PRC's ability to control. 130 The pros-
pects for a successful transfer of sovereignty, conditioned upon an eco-
nomically independent Hong Kong, is discussed in the following
section.
IV. The Joint Declaration's Potential for Success in Light of PRC
Treaty Practice and Political Influence
This Comment compared PRC interpretations of treaty law with
Western views as codified in the Vienna Convention. It also outlined
the political events that compelled the PRC and Britain to sign the
Joint Declaration. Using these two sections as a framework, this Com-
ment now analyzes the various problems which may arise in the future
because of differences in treaty interpretation in light of a changing
political climate.
A. THE TERMINATION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION
1. Using the Theory of Unequal Treaty to Terminate the Joint
Declaration
The PRC traditionally uses the unequal treaty doctrine to abrogate
its treaty obligations.18 7 If the PRC applies the unequal treaty doctrine
to the Joint Declaration, it may use the reciprocity principle to abro-
gate the Agreement. Specifically, the PRC considers the nineteenth
century treaties between China and Great Britain that cede or lease
parts of Hong Kong to Britain unequal.188 Under a PRC interpretation
of the unequal treaty doctrine, Britain's occupation of Hong Kong is
China, 7 CHINA Bus. REV. 28 (1980) (discussing how Special Economic Zones plan to
function).
135. W. BEAZER, THE COMMERCIAL FUTURE OF HONG KONG 74, 75 (1978). Brit-
ish entrepreneurs use Hong Kong as a haven for investment because Hong Kong's cor-
porate tax rates are far below comparable rates in England. Id. In addition to the tax
advantages, Britain's trade surplus with Hong Kong reached the level of 1.5 billion
Hong Kong dollars in 1976. See also N. MINERS, supra note 4, at 8-17 (detailing
British interests in Hong Kong).
136. See generally, Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at arts. 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, annex 3
(discussing the limitations on PRC control contained in the Joint Declaration).
137. See G. Scott, supra note 42, at 90 (discussing the PRC definition of the
unequal treaty doctrine).
138. See Johnson, The Mousetrapping of Hong Kong, 24 ASIAN SURV. 887, 898
(1984) (noting that on August 15, 1983, Communist Party General Secretary Hu
Yaobang stated that he considered the so-called three Hong Kong treaties unequal).
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still invalid. 139 The terms of the Joint Declaration permit Britain to
exchange Hong Kong, an illegally occupied territory, for the PRC's
promise to limit its control over Hong Kong's government." 0 Thus, al-
though Britain's obligation in the Joint Declaration is equal on its face,
it fails to satisfy the PRC's requirement of treaty equality.14 The PRC
views Britain as transferring its sovereignty over a region of the PRC
over which Britain has no sovereignty. 142 Accordingly, under the PRC's
theory of international treaty law, the PRC may legitimately invalidate
the Joint Declaration. Since 1949, however, the PRC has not declared
unequal any bilateral treaties that its Communist Government con-
cluded.1 43 The PRC fears that using the unequal treaty doctrine to ab-
rogate a treaty would allow other nations to employ the same doctrine
to abrogate a treaty concluded with the PRC."' It, therefore, is un-
likely that the PRC would invoke the unequal treaty doctrine to abro-
gate the Joint Declaration.
2. Terminating the Joint Declaration Under the Theory of Funda-
mental Change in Circumstance
The PRC may use another tool, such as a fundamental change in
circumstance, to invalidate or terminate the Joint Declaration. 4e Previ-
ously, not every fundamental change constituted grounds for automatic
treaty abrogation.14 Instead, the PRC tried to rectify, through consul-
139. The PRC's reciprocity argument, as applied to the Joint Declaration, hinges
on accepting the premise that Great Britain illegally possesses Hong Kong.
140. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at arts. 1-3.
141. See HUNGDAH Cuiu, supra note 32, at 60-71 (describing the irrelevancy of
equality on its face).
142. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stipulating that the unequal treaty
doctrine falls within the PRC's, not the West's, concept of international law).
143. See HUNGDAH CHju, supra note 32, at 64. To date, the PRC only declared
unequal those treaties concluded by prior Chinese governments or by different nations.
Id. at 65-71.
144. Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression Between the People's Re-
public of China and the Union of Burma, 3 People's Republic 13 (Feb. 2, 1960).
Burma charges that the Sino-Burmese Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggres-
sion contains only verbal reciprocity. Id. Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "each
contracting party undertakes ... not to take part in any military alliance directed
against the other contracting party." Id. But the PRC, with over three million people in
its armed forces, needs no ally to protect itself against 100,000 Burmese troops.
HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 32, at 64. By forbidding Burma to form an alliance with a
country like the Soviet Union or the United States the Treaty, though equal in word-
ing, leaves the Burmese unprotected against Chinese expansion. Id.
145. See WANG, supra note 79, at 15 (explaining the PRC's interpretation of fun-
damental change in circumstance).
146. See supra note 77 (describing how a Soviet change did not prompt a PRC
breach).
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tation, the imbalance caused by a fundamental change in circum-
stance.147 If left wing extremists take control of the PRC's Communist
Party, however, and decide that a capitalist Hong Kong impairs the
advancement of Party ideology, 148 the new PRC government may use
the fundamental change in circumstance theory to abrogate the Joint
Declaration.
For example, if the extremists come to power, they could abolish ar-
ticle 31 of the PRC's 1982 Constitution and then classify the abolition
as a fundamental change in circumstance.1 49 Article 31 creates the in-
ternal procedure by which the PRC allows "special administrative re-
gions" to exist under laws differing from the laws of the PRC.80 The
Joint Declaration permits Hong Kong to maintain its current economic
and political system pursuant to this article.1 51
Without the safeguard provided by article 31 of the Constitution,
Hong Kong has no guarantee of retaining its political independence,
a1 2
because other provisions of the Chinese Constitution would control
when the administrative or local rules of Hong Kong contravene it.
183
For example, the Constitution stresses that the PRC's economic system
is based on socialist public ownership of the means of production.'" A
147. Id.
148. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (describing left wing ideology
and the probability of an extremist swing in PRC politics).
149. P.R.C. CONST. art. 31 (1982). Contrary to the American notion that a Consti-
tution is a stable and lasting document, the PRC frequently and significantly changes
its Constitution. P.R.C. CONST., adopted on Sept. 30, 1954, March 5, 1978, December
4, 1982, Foreign Press, Peking (Translation). It, therefore, is not inconceivable for the
PRC to change its Constitution again, particularly if a new, ideological government
comes to power.
150. P.R.C. CoNsr. art. 31 (1982) (stating "the state may establish special admin-
istrative regions when necessary). The systems to be instituted in special administrative
regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in the
light of specific conditions". Id. The PRC invented special administration regions with
Taiwan specifically in mind, but to date the PRC only applies the concept to Hong
Kong. See Weng, Some Key Aspects of the 1982 Draft Constitution of the Peoples
Republic of China, 492 CHINA Q. 505, 505 (1983); see also P.R.C. CONST. preamble
(1982) (mentioning Taiwan in regard to reunification of the motherland).
151. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at art. 3.
152. Questions arise as to whether article 31, even as it exists in the 1982 Constitu-
tion, protects Hong Kong from imposition of communist structure. See Clarke, supra
note 9, at 74-81 (discussing socialism and the 1982 Constitution).
153. P.R.C. CONST. art. 5 (1982) (stating "no law or administrative or local rules
or regulations shall contravene the Constitution").
154. P.R.C. CONST. art. 6 (1982). The PRC bases its political system upon the
principle of democratic centralism. Even if China abolishes its current Constitution
subsequent documents will almost surely incorporate this principle. 1954, 1975, and
1978 Constitutions, translated in FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS, PEKING. See also
SCHRAM, POLITICAL THOUGHT OF MAO TSE TUNG 313 (1977) (defining the Party's
system of democratic centralism "in which the minority is subordinate to the majority,
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capitalist Hong Kong, therefore, contravenes Chinese constitutional law
and the PRC could not tolerate its existence.' 5 Accordingly, the PRC
may abrogate the Joint Declaration under the doctrine of fundamental
change in circumstance to establish a socialist Hong Kong.00
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, however, expressly forbids a
country to use a law of internal governance to abrogate a treaty. 1 7
Considering the fact that the PRC is striving to gain respect in the
international arena, it is unlikely that the PRC would use the funda-
mental change in circumstance theory to terminate the Joint Declara-
tion. 158 Instead, the PRC will probably try to implement the changes
that it wants in the Joint Declaration through consultation with Great
Britain. 0 The success of such consultation depends on the Joint Decla-
ration's ability to resolve disputes.
B. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION
The Joint Liaison Group provides an already established structure
for consultation between the PRC and Great Britain.1 0 If the Group is
unable to resolve a dispute, it refers the issue to the British and Chi-
nese Governments for further consultation. 161 The Joint Declaration
the lower level to the higher level, the part to the whole, and the entire membership to
the Central Committee. . ."); R. FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, supra
note 2, at 367 (noting democratic centralism is mass organizations); WANG, CONTEM-
PORARY CHINESE POLITIcS 48 (1980) (attributing this "organizational principle" to
Lenin).
155. P.R.C. CONST. art. 6 (1982).
156. Under the Vienna Convention a signatory cannot invoke the provisions of its
internal law to justify its failure to perform or abrogate a treaty. Vienna Convention,
supra note 10, at art. 27. Although there is no existing information on whether the
PRC accepts this principle, the PRC's notion of state sovereignty and hence national
security directly conflicts with a provision limiting internal behavior. See notes 27-29
and accompanying text (discussing article 27).
157. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 27.
158. New York Times, Sept. 27, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
159. Joint Declaration supra note 3, at art. 3(4). The Joint Declaration will ulti-
mately contain problems of interpretation. For instance, the Declaration calls for the
PRC's appointment of Hong Kong's chief executive on the basis of elections or local
consultations. Id. "Local Consultations" implies anything from citizen discussions in
local town halls to a meeting of PRC officials in a Hong Kong hotel room. See infra
note 160 (discussing the selection of Hong Kong officials).
160. See generally, Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at annex 2 (discussing Sino-
British Joint Liaison Group). In the Joint Liaison Group one senior official of ambassa-
dorial rank and four additional members represent each side. Joint Declaration, supra
note 3, at annex 2, art. 7. These representatives will hold consultations to ensure the
smooth implementation of the Joint Declaration. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at
annex 2, art. 2.
161. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at annex 2, art. 3.
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provides for disbanding this Group by the year 2000.162 Considering
the Joint Liaison Group's short lifespan and its policy of referring
problems to the two Governments, it cannot effectively resolve or en-
force complex or long term interpretive problems.16 3
The Joint Declaration's article 2 of annex 2 empowers the Joint Liai-
son Group to establish special subgroups "to deal with particular sub-
jects requiring expert assistance. ' ' 1 4 Forming such a subgroup for
resolving disputes would help the Joint Declaration's parties solve inter-
pretive problems arising from the Agreement.1 65
The PRC, however, currently has little incentive to create such a
subgroup.166 Without substantial outside pressure, it is unlikely that the
PRC will limit its sovereignty and submit a Joint Declaration dispute
to third party adjudication. The PRC currently enjoys a reputation for
162. Id. at annex 2, art. 8.
163. Any dispute-resolving body that possesses no enforcement power, like the
Joint Liason Group, and any dispute-resolving body whose decisions revert to another
source after its decisions receive a negative reception, like the Joint Liason Group,
potentially holds negligible authority.
164. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at annex 2, art. 11.
165. Since the PRC rejects the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
and no enforcement mechanism exists to enforce the Joint Declaration, the Joint Decla-
ration's interpretation hinges on negotiations between the PRC and Britain. See supra
note 100 (discussing the PRC's rejection of the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice). Precedent exists, however, for the formation of a dispute-resolving sub-
group. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (describing the configuration of
the dispute-resolving body in the Korean Armistice Agreement). The PRC willingly
agreed to bring before an arbitration panel problems in interpreting the Korean Armi-
stice. Id.
166. A possible way for Britain to provide the incentive to form a subgroup to
resolve interpretational disputes rests with Britain's willingness to permit reforms in
Hong Kong's legislative structure. See White Paper: The Further Development of Rep-
resentative Government in Hong Kong, November 1984, reprinted in D. BONAVIA,
supra note 1, at 210-24 (discussing Hong Kong's current legislative structure).
The Joint Declaration gives Hong Kong in 1997 the autonomy to choose its execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Joint Declaration, supra note 3,
at annex 1, art. 1. If Britain grants this autonomy to Hong Kong now, allowing Hong
Kong to directly elect its own legislative body, by 1997 a government entrenched in the
democratic system will exist for ten years. A common principle suggests that, people
more adamantly resist giving up something they already possess, than being prohibited
from acquiring something they never possessed. Accordingly, the people of Hong Kong
will offer more resistance to PRC control, if the PRC tries to restrict the Hong Kong
people's right to directly elect its own legislature, than if the Hong Kong people never
acquire this right from the PRC.
Recently in Hong Kong, British officials permitted electoral colleges, chosen by Hong
Kong residents, to select members to Hong Kong's legislative Council. D. BONAVIA,
supra note 1, at 212. By the next elections in 1988, some British officials recommend a
system of "one man, one direct vote." La, The Buck Stops Here, 130 FAR EAST. ECON.
REv. 28 (1985). The PRC contends that it will not permit such a system. Id. at 43.
Rather than face reprisals from the PRC, Britain may use this recommendation of a
direct vote in Hong Kong as a bargaining incentive to entice the PRC to accept a
dispute resolving subgroup with enforcement powers.
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being a reasonable and responsible member of the international com-
munity; a reputation primarily enhanced by the signing of the Joint
Declaration.16 7 The potential dividends which would accrue to the PRC
if it agreed to form a neutral body to resolve and enforce disputes,
would insignificantly foster its public image, but would severely limit
its perceived right of sovereignty. 68
Differences between Western and PRC treaty practice such as the
unequal treaty or fundamental change in circumstance doctrine will
probably not affect the PRC's adherence to the Joint Declaration. The
PRC's refusal to submit disputes to third party adjudicatory bodies,
therefore, underlines one important difference that could realistically
effect the PRC's adherence to the Joint Declaration.
C. OUTSIDE INFLUENCES AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF THE JOINT
DECLARATION
Without a neutral body enforcing the Joint Declaration, the PRC
will rely on economic or political influences to interpret the Agreement.
These influences emanate from the economic fate of Deng's moderniza-
tion program.169
1. The Success of the Joint Declaration Under Deng's Leadership
If Deng significantly tampers with the Joint Declaration, he could
trigger a mass exodus of Western business from Hong Kong.170 This
exodus would threaten the PRC's modernization drive, and would
weaken Deng's Party control and national power.
Both the PRC's economic success, achieved in part through Hong
Kong's continued prosperity, and its adherence to the Joint Declaration
interrelate with the PRC's desire to reunify with Taiwan. Deng believes
that the PRC's rapid economic growth, coupled with the lateral free-
dom given to Hong Kong residents, gives Taiwan incentive to unify the
Chinese people under an agreement similar to the Joint Declaration.'
167. New York Times, Sept. 27, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
168. See G. ScoT-r, supra note 42, at 132 (explaining how "intervention" by any
third party infringes on the PRC's sovereignty).
169. See Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at annex 2 (providing that the Joint
Liason Group possesses no enforcement power).
170. N. MINERS, supra note 4, at 22.
171. Interview with Gu Xiancheng, Advisor, China International Trust and Invest-
ment Corporation, Beijing (July 24, 1985); Peoples Daily, Sept. 27, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
The Republic of China rejects this proposition claiming such a solution causes it to lose
its sovereignty. Foreign Minister Rejects Hong Kong Solution, Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Service, Oct. 5, 1984, at 6, col. 3. Without sovereignty Taiwan retains no
legal means to protect itself against the PRC taking away rights the PRC promised to
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Accordingly, any PRC deviation from the Joint Declaration weakens
the pro-unification message that the PRC wants to convey to
Taiwan.7 2
2. The Success of the Joint Declaration After Deng
At eighty-one years old, Deng's death or retirement is imminent.
Consequently, assuming that the PRC's modernization continues to
succeed, Deng will leave Party control to his followers rather than to a
more extremist group.1 73 Reformists who incorporate Deng's ideology
likely will continue to adhere to the Joint Declaration and interpret the
treaty to favor significant autonomy for Hong Kong. Many leftists,
however, wait for the PRC's economy to falter to redefine the PRC's
government. 17 4 Chinese leftists still adhere to traditional Maoist ideas,
denouncing the corrosive influence of Deng's policies on Party and so-
cial conduct. 75 Top leftist officials advocate opening up China to the
West, but only in conjunction with "sharp vigilance and education of
communist ideology as its core."1 6 Middle level cadres, who joined the
PRC Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution and who will
hold the highest positions of power by 1997, support factionalism or
constant revolution to establish a true communist society.277
The PRC's turbulent political past suggests that the chances for rad-
ical changes in the future are likely. Harsh extremist movements 78
mark the PRC's history and are reminiscent of the Chinese propensity
for undergoing periodic ideological purges. An unsuccessful moderniza-
tion program could provide the leftists with the power to gain control-
ling positions in the Communist Party.17 9 These leftists will place
tighter controls at all levels of government.18 The PRC's economic
Taiwan at the time of the unification. Chiu, 1984 Sino-British Agreement on Hong
Kong and its Implications on China's Unification, 21 Issues & Studies, 13, 19 (1985).
Hungdah Chiu, Prospects for the Unification of China: An Analysis of the Views of
the Republic of China on Taiwan, 23 ASIAN SURVEY 1081-94 (1983).
172. Interview with Gu Xiancheng, Advisor, China International Trust and Invest-
ment Corporation, Beijing (July 24, 1985).
173. Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1985, at A18, col. 1.
174. Bonavia, Socialist Balancing Act, supra note 116, at 37.
175. Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
176. Bonavia, Socialist Balancing Act, supra note 116, at 36.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 36 (listing these extremist movements as the Great Leap Forward
1958-1961 and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1976).
179. Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1985, at A18, col. 1.
180. Bonavia, Socialist Balancing Act, supra note 116, at 36. AS an example of
this dogma, veteran economic planner and chief party disciplinarian Chen Yub stresses
the negative influence of "decadent capitalist ideology" entering through China's in-
creasingly open door. Id.
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needs and its desire to unite with Taiwan will most likely be the strong-
est limitations on the PRC's assertion of absolute control over Hong
Kong.
Constant tension between reformists and leftists adds to Hong
Kong's insecurity over its political and economic future. After Deng
leaves power, Deng's followers' continuation of Party control would as-
sure Hong Kong that the PRC will continue to adhere to the Joint
Declaration and to interpret the treaty to promote Hong Kong's auton-
omy. In contrast, if the leftist faction of the Communist Party gains
control after Deng's departure, it is doubtful that the PRC will adhere
to the intent of the Joint Declaration and it is unlikely that the PRC
will interpret the treaty to afford Hong Kong significant autonomy.
CONCLUSION
Despite the differences between PRC and Western countries regard-
ing treaty law, the PRC's effort to move closer to a society governed by
the rule of law, rather than the rule of man, 181 assures Hong Kong,
Great Britain, and the international business community that the Joint
Declaration will be binding. The PRC's past treatment of treaties as an
important source of international law suggests that it will honor the
Joint Declaration. Without a neutral adjudicatory body to resolve inter-
pretational disputes, the PRC's interpretation of the document, how-
ever, depends on the success of Deng Xiaoping's reformist drive for
economic modernization and the PRC's desire to reunite with Taiwan.
For Hong Kong to avoid dependence on the PRC's economic and
political future, the burden rests with Great Britain to ensure the pro-
tection of Hong Kong's residents' rights. To accomplish this, Great
Britain should force the expansion of the Joint Liason Group's author-
ity18 2 to include an arbitration panel comprised similarly to the body
formed by the Korean Armistice Agreement. 83
Jay R. Goldstein
181. See DEBARRY, SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION, supra note 44, at 86-148
(contrasting Confucian and Legalist thought).
182. See supra notes 163-64 (explaining method available to Great Britain to force
expansion of the Joint Liaison Group).
183. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text (outlining the formation of the
Korean Armistice Commission).
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